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Hempenstall, Peter. Truth’s Fool: Derek Freeman and the War over Cultural
Anthropology, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2017.
Peter Hempenstall has written a good book—well researched, well documented, and
presented with measured tone and clarity of thought and expression. Does he shed new light
on Derek Freeman and the War over Cultural Anthropology? I believe he does.
Hempenstall is an accomplished biographer and historian of European colonialism in
the Pacific—especially the Samoan islands. From his academic positions in New Zealand and
Australia—including a fellowship at the Australian National University where his office was
down the corridor from Freeman’s—Hempenstall was an interested and knowledgeable
observer of Derek Freeman and the Freeman-Mead debates. He had no interaction with
Freeman or with Freeman’s critics during that time, however, and he was never involved in
the debates regarding cultural anthropologist Margaret Mead. In short, he wades into this
arena unburdened by personal or professional baggage. Hempenstall sets the scene in that
arena:
In his attack on the early career findings of Mead, and in his passionate rejection of
cultural determinism and relativism, Freeman opened fresh wounds in the centurylong disagreements over nature versus nurture.
He was also a polarizing figure. The style with which he asserted his views,
the vehemence of his replies to opponents, and the unyielding quality of his mission
to prove Mead wrong alienated many anthropologists. Such fervor had its roots deep
in his own past and personality, but his aggression also had to do with the way many
anthropologists dealt with his unorthodox ideas and behavior. The profession seemed
to round as one on Freeman in two decades of vituperative debate (p. 5).
In Truth’s Fool, Hempenstall successfully takes on the role of “fair-minded” observer
(pp. 101, 184, 209, 224) applying “a biographer’s perspective and the historian’s tools to
excavate the muddy waters of the Freeman-Mead debates” (p. xi). The book has two
interconnected goals. The first is to write a biography and intellectual history of Derek
Freeman and the controversies he ignited (p. xi). This is straightforward for an historian, and
Hempenstall handles it well. The second goal is an “appraisal of the controversy” itself (ibid).
That is trickier for an academic outsider, but in the unavoidable tradeoff between the
advantages of insider knowledge versus those of outsider objectivity, Hempenstall rewards us
by handling the academic issues competently and the appraisals judiciously. As he argues,
“looking for winners and losers in this psychological free-for-all does not advance our
understanding” (p. 100).
Hempenstall’s appraisal of the arguments and counterarguments steps lightly over the
underlying issue concerning human nature that both Mead and Freeman took to be the core
issue, but the Freeman-Mead debate itself failed to tackle that issue head on. The reason for
this failure seems to be threefold. First, although Freeman was right that Mead’s early work
in Samoa was historically pivotal in launching cultural determinism as an academic and
cultural ideology, it was never the intellectual lynchpin that Freeman took it to be. Presenting
his refutation of Mead’s work as if it was the lynchpin sent the debate into a thicket of side
issues from the start. Second, Freeman had little constructive insight to add to the debate over
human nature other than his cogent but vague claims about human choice behavior. Finally,
Freeman’s critics themselves offered little of substance in support of their counter claims
about human nature, and they were thus readily diverted to side issues where they were
armed too often with “false assertions and misrepresentations” (p. 184).
Hempenstall’s primary goal is biographical. He wants to “analyze the ideas,
motivations, and personal and professional intentions that underlay Derek Freeman’s various
quests” in order to “add necessary, rounded dimensions to an understanding of Freeman’s
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harsh intellectualism and eccentric personality” (ibid, p. 10). The book’s title, Truth’s Fool, is
central to that understanding, for “Freeman proudly boasted he was ‘Truth’s Fool,’ by which
he meant that, like the medieval fool at a royal court, he had the temerity to prick the illusions
of his master” (p. 6). Hempenstall quotes Freeman’s own comment in offering “truth’s fool”
as his role in life: “I think scientific truth is sort of like a god to me” (p. 130). This in itself
was enough to trigger a collective snarl from a discipline that had largely come to assert that
claims of “scientific truth” were just insidious political arguments.
Hempenstall’s sources include the excerpts, notes, and comments that Don Tuzin—
initially Freeman’s student and then his colleague and close friend—made after Freeman’s
death from the diary Freeman kept each day starting in 1963. Tuzin’s excerpts and notes
cover the years from 1963 to 1990, which was the last year of the diary Tuzin was able to
complete before Tuzin himself died. Tuzin shared Freeman’s hope that access to his diary
would underpin a “no-nonsense, objective appraisal of Freeman the man and the
anthropologist” (p. 13), and that is what Hempenstall delivers.
Hempenstall provides carefully researched accounts of three great but temporary
emotional and psychological crises in Freeman’s life. The first occurred in Sarawak in 1961
following a clash with Tom Harrisson. The second occurred in Melbourne in 1965 following
Freeman’s presentation to a psychoanalysis conference of a paper critical of Freud—for
which Freeman was verbally attacked and ostracized. Following this episode, Freeman was
apparently hospitalized, given electroshock treatment, and then put on tranquilizers (p. 98).
The third crisis occurred in Manu’a in 1967 following closely upon Freeman’s conclusion
from local testimony about Mead’s behavior while she was a resident there that Mead’s
account of Samoan sexual behavior was “a projection on to Samoan females of her own
sexual experiences as a young woman” (p. 107, quoting Freeman, original emphasis).
In 1974, Freeman was diagnosed as suffering from bipolar disorder for which he took
medication until the following year (pp. 134, 136). In August of 1975, Freeman wrote in his
diary: “I have no doubt that I am an individual prone to manic-depressive affective reactions
and that I have been undergoing one of these reactions since last March” (p. 136).
Hempenstall notes that Freeman’s “academic life was speckled with incendiary
encounters and comments,” but his diaries show that he “strove constantly against the more
negative effects of his sometimes unsettling behavior” and that he was engaged in a “constant
struggle for mental equilibrium” (pp. 131, 137, 138). The diaries show that “self-doubt
assailed him, though he was careful to mask it” (p. 118). Hempenstall writes that Freeman’s
“colleagues and opponents saw little or nothing of this interior struggle, but the therapeutic
search for who he was and could be, where his negative drives originated, and how he could
rid himself of them was real, arduous, and permanent” (p. 138).
Hempenstall concludes that, on the weight of evidence covering most of Freeman’s
adult life, a diagnosis of ‘madness’ is unnecessary (p. 108). He examines these matters
closely for the purpose of understanding Derek Freeman, the person, whereas Freeman’s
critics more often carried out such analyses for the purpose of attacking and undermining
both the person and his arguments. Hempenstall notes that “the attribution of ‘madness’ stops
all further questioning” (p. 141). It is the ultimate ad hominem argument. What Hempenstall
finds instead and attempts to correct is what he calls a “new mythology” about Freeman “the
wrecker, the cheat, the monster” that critics have built up “based on half truths and outright
falsehoods” (p. 254).
In assessing Freeman’s intellectual contributions, Hempenstall observes that Freeman
repeatedly “became obsessed with the One Big Idea and insisted on preparing himself to
pursue it with relentless scientific study. Yet he failed to bring any of these ideas to a
resolution” (p. 250). The most vexing of these failures involved Freeman’s clarion call over
several decades for anthropologists to develop a “unified science of humanity” that somehow
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linked biology and culture (p. 81). Hempenstall is not alone in observing that Freeman’s
solution, an “anthropology of choice,” remained no more than “a vision, rather than a
concrete, testable possibility, at least in his hands” (p. 239).
It seems apparent that while Freeman saw that the “answer lay in linking biology and
culture through human choice behavior” (ibid), he never saw how to link them. In the end, his
forays into psychoanalysis, ethology, philosophy, and sociobiology all ended in cul-de-sacs.
When he first launched himself on this quest in the 1960s, he was well ahead of his time, as
he claimed, but he was perhaps also too early in the application of evolutionary biology to the
explanation of human affairs for him to find a proper foothold. By the 1980s and 1990s when
Margaret Mead and Samoa and The Fateful Hoaxing of Margaret Mead were published,
Freeman had become too obsessed with “the Mead thing” to take advantage of the rapid
advances then blossoming in that field.
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